Today's Daas Torah
Here's a theory that I developed recently...
The gemara uses the term "da'as Torah" in a sense totally different than today's usage. It appears once, in Chullin 90b, to ask whether a cited opinion on a halachic matter was logincally necessary from the sources, or the tanna's personal opinion as informed by his da'as Torah.
But Orthodoxy requires giving rabbis authority on halachic questions. And it's not overly novel to say that such authority doesn't come from just formal knowledge, but also having a feel for the material and perspective caused by long exposure to Torah. Otherwise, someone with a good CD should be able to out-pasken a learned rav who relies on his own memory.
It is also not overly contravercial to extend this authority to Torah questions that aren't halachic, such as questions of philosophy or identifying appropriate areas for going lifnim mishuras hadin (beyond the letter of the law).
Where da'as Torah as meant by the contemporary usage hits shakier ground is when it's extended in the other direction: pragmatic questions where the unknowns revolve around the facts on the ground rather than the Torah issues. Such as most career or shidduch questions. After all, the gemara advises the rabbinate to leave military questions to the generals. Should we not leave medical ones to the doctors, career questions to career counselors -- or at least people who work in the jobs in question?
The extension of da'as Torah from the Talmudic usage is first found in R' Yisra'el Salanter's Or Yisra'el. In Mussar, it's about the role of Torah in personal development. Yes, his formulation justified approaching the rav on non-halachic issues, by noting that every decision has impact on which life experiences one has, and in turn on one's mussar growth. Someone who chooses to consult a rav who knows their personality and in which ways they're trying to grow, could use the insight.
However, robbed of the connection to Mussar, the original motivation is gone and the term has a totally knew meaning. What's called "da'as Torah" today often involves approaching a gadol who doesn't know the asker well enough to give such mashgi'ach-style help. Or even if one's own rosh yshivah, it could be done even years after their daily contact. Not at all what Rav Yisra'el was describing.
Rav Yisra'el does ascribe importance to the effect of Torah on shaping the thought of the one who learns it. If I may add, the word da'as is not merely zikaron (memory), but knowledge that both comes from chokhmah and binah, but is also at times replaced by the sefirah of keser which is their cause. Knowledge that comes from thought, and shapes thought.
The current notion relies entirely on this notion, which Rav Yisra'el cited as buttress for why one should seek about Mussar advice. Without it being about mussar advice, and fitting in one's plan to shteig, to ascend the ladder, one has a totally new ionvention.
Yes, Da'as Torah should give the rav better ability to analyze questions than the asker, or anyone else whose mind lacks that Torah development. However, does that ability compensate for not having as many of the facts about which to reason -- including the da'as (if I may use my own conceit) of the topic at hand? My personal opinion is, rarely.
(This is to be distinguished from the chassidic belief in the ru'ach haqodesh Hashem grants tzadiqim, so that their decisions even in non-Torah matters is of value. One is about the quality of mind, the other about Divine Aid given people who carry their kehillos' burdens. There it's from Hashem, the rebbe's own knowledge is irrelevent so this objection wouldn't apply. One either believes the help is granted freely, or less so.)
The other issue that is different than R' Yisra'el's original formulation is a shift to an all-or-nothing. Something "the gedolim" have that the rest of us lack. Rather, it ought to be relative. Whomever learned more Torah should be more shaped by it; whomever less, less. This artificial division into have and have-not has returned back to affect the core of Torah questions, halachah. The local shul rav lost most of his authority, both in his mispallelim's eyes and in his own, as he's from the have-not class. Many local rabbanim are merely conduits, forwarding all but the most trivial questions to their rashei yeshiva.
By making such a class, "the gedolim", as opposed to speaking of relative greatness, the community is forced to believe that da'as Torah is monolithic. And with a bit of unconscious circular reasoning, this is made true. The definition of da'as Torah is made to be the conclusion of the gedolim and the definition of who is a gadol is restricted by who agrees with the accepts answer.
This is so well accepted that authors and publishers can not put out histories that disprove such unity of thought. If it's told that the Netziv read the newspaper on Shabbos, or allowed secular studied in Vilozhin, or that fellows in Salbodka argued issues like Communism, Freud, or the other hot topics of their time, the hoi paloi will question the rav's greatness, which raises problems of shemiras halashon. Even when from an unimpeachable source, like the Torah Temimah or R' N Kamenecki. It's not a judgement of fiction, but of inappropriate truth.
Without the core notion of having a mussar plan, one can't transplant the notions that depend upon it. Such drastic redefinition is inevitable.
The gemara uses the term "da'as Torah" in a sense totally different than today's usage. It appears once, in Chullin 90b, to ask whether a cited opinion on a halachic matter was logincally necessary from the sources, or the tanna's personal opinion as informed by his da'as Torah.
But Orthodoxy requires giving rabbis authority on halachic questions. And it's not overly novel to say that such authority doesn't come from just formal knowledge, but also having a feel for the material and perspective caused by long exposure to Torah. Otherwise, someone with a good CD should be able to out-pasken a learned rav who relies on his own memory.
It is also not overly contravercial to extend this authority to Torah questions that aren't halachic, such as questions of philosophy or identifying appropriate areas for going lifnim mishuras hadin (beyond the letter of the law).
Where da'as Torah as meant by the contemporary usage hits shakier ground is when it's extended in the other direction: pragmatic questions where the unknowns revolve around the facts on the ground rather than the Torah issues. Such as most career or shidduch questions. After all, the gemara advises the rabbinate to leave military questions to the generals. Should we not leave medical ones to the doctors, career questions to career counselors -- or at least people who work in the jobs in question?
The extension of da'as Torah from the Talmudic usage is first found in R' Yisra'el Salanter's Or Yisra'el. In Mussar, it's about the role of Torah in personal development. Yes, his formulation justified approaching the rav on non-halachic issues, by noting that every decision has impact on which life experiences one has, and in turn on one's mussar growth. Someone who chooses to consult a rav who knows their personality and in which ways they're trying to grow, could use the insight.
However, robbed of the connection to Mussar, the original motivation is gone and the term has a totally knew meaning. What's called "da'as Torah" today often involves approaching a gadol who doesn't know the asker well enough to give such mashgi'ach-style help. Or even if one's own rosh yshivah, it could be done even years after their daily contact. Not at all what Rav Yisra'el was describing.
Rav Yisra'el does ascribe importance to the effect of Torah on shaping the thought of the one who learns it. If I may add, the word da'as is not merely zikaron (memory), but knowledge that both comes from chokhmah and binah, but is also at times replaced by the sefirah of keser which is their cause. Knowledge that comes from thought, and shapes thought.
The current notion relies entirely on this notion, which Rav Yisra'el cited as buttress for why one should seek about Mussar advice. Without it being about mussar advice, and fitting in one's plan to shteig, to ascend the ladder, one has a totally new ionvention.
Yes, Da'as Torah should give the rav better ability to analyze questions than the asker, or anyone else whose mind lacks that Torah development. However, does that ability compensate for not having as many of the facts about which to reason -- including the da'as (if I may use my own conceit) of the topic at hand? My personal opinion is, rarely.
(This is to be distinguished from the chassidic belief in the ru'ach haqodesh Hashem grants tzadiqim, so that their decisions even in non-Torah matters is of value. One is about the quality of mind, the other about Divine Aid given people who carry their kehillos' burdens. There it's from Hashem, the rebbe's own knowledge is irrelevent so this objection wouldn't apply. One either believes the help is granted freely, or less so.)
The other issue that is different than R' Yisra'el's original formulation is a shift to an all-or-nothing. Something "the gedolim" have that the rest of us lack. Rather, it ought to be relative. Whomever learned more Torah should be more shaped by it; whomever less, less. This artificial division into have and have-not has returned back to affect the core of Torah questions, halachah. The local shul rav lost most of his authority, both in his mispallelim's eyes and in his own, as he's from the have-not class. Many local rabbanim are merely conduits, forwarding all but the most trivial questions to their rashei yeshiva.
By making such a class, "the gedolim", as opposed to speaking of relative greatness, the community is forced to believe that da'as Torah is monolithic. And with a bit of unconscious circular reasoning, this is made true. The definition of da'as Torah is made to be the conclusion of the gedolim and the definition of who is a gadol is restricted by who agrees with the accepts answer.
This is so well accepted that authors and publishers can not put out histories that disprove such unity of thought. If it's told that the Netziv read the newspaper on Shabbos, or allowed secular studied in Vilozhin, or that fellows in Salbodka argued issues like Communism, Freud, or the other hot topics of their time, the hoi paloi will question the rav's greatness, which raises problems of shemiras halashon. Even when from an unimpeachable source, like the Torah Temimah or R' N Kamenecki. It's not a judgement of fiction, but of inappropriate truth.
Without the core notion of having a mussar plan, one can't transplant the notions that depend upon it. Such drastic redefinition is inevitable.
posted by micha @ 11/26/2004 11:12:00 AM
