Causality in Halakhah

A major factor in the Terri Schiavo case is that a feeding tube was defined to be heroic medical intervention, rather than a parallel to the charity we would give anyone who can't obtain food themselves.

In halakhah, what's the line? I would like to suggest that it is defined based on another halachic distinction.

How can someone free a slave? The procedure is to give the slave a writ. But as a slave, anything he acquires becomes the property of his owner. Even putting it in his hand doesn't make it his. Therefore he cannot actually receive the writ -- a "Catch 22"! We say "his writ and his 'hand' (i.e. his power of domain) arrive together."

On the other hand, if someone want to sell something to another, among the ways he can transfer ownership is by giving the other a contract. Giving it includes putting it in another's field. But if he's selling a field, putting the contract in that very field doesn't constitute giving it. In this case, we do not say that the contract and the ownership arrive together.

The Qetzos asks how these two cases differ.

The basic difference is that the slave's natural state is to have a power of domain. His being a slave is a monei'ah, an impediment, holding back that natural state from expression. The writ is therefore hasaras hamonei'ah removing that impediment. The field, however, is not already part of the buyer's domain. Rather, the contract is a sibah, a cause.

Rav Amiel explains that causes must precede their effects. Therefore, the field must be acquired before it can be used as domain for receiving acquisitions. However, a hasaras hamonei'ah need not be earlier than the effect. Implied in this explanation is that the sibah is already acting even during the suppression by a monei'ah, thereby preserving the necessary time sequence.

Halachicly, a sibah and a monei'ah are very different things. It's not just that a monei'ah is a negative sibah, a cause for the opposite state.

Until a person is a goseis (expected to die within 72 hours), there is no immediate cause for death. Anything that would cause death at that point would be new, in the nature of a sibah. However, for a goseis, the cause is already there. If medicine is presenting death, it's a monei'ah. Once we conclude a monei'ah is involved there are two further possibilities: either hasaras hamonei'ah ("pulling the plug"), or one can refuse to introduce the monei'ah to begin with; active or passive.

The last option is by far the most often permissable.

To look at physical cases:

Removing Terry Shialvo's feeding tube was a sibah for her death. She would not have otherwise died, and in fact died more than 72 hours later even without drink or food.

Removing artificial respiration from a goseis would be haras hamonei'ah.

However, once the machine is disconnected, for example to change a filter, to reconnect it would be to refuse the monei'ah to begin with. Although it's not the removal of something stopping the death, one is allowing the actual cause to run its course rather than initiating the causal sequence. And, as we saw, that's a halachicly different species.

Life and Consciousness

The differences between the treatment of the Terry Shiavo in American law and halakhah do not rest in scientific knowledge, but in definitions. To be precise two particular definitions: First, determining the line between beneficence and artificially prolonging life. Second, defining which medical states qualify as "human life". In this entry, I'm just looking at the second one.

R' JB Soloveitchik noted on numerous occasions that just as there is an element of mishpat (intuitive law) in every choq (statute based in an idea too subtle for human comprehension), there is an element of choq in every mishpat. Parah adumah (the Red Heifer), the textbook case of choq, has elements that have been explained by numerous rabbanim. For example, Rashi quotes a chazal that the parah adumah is intentionally an adult version of the eigel hazahav (golden calf). The contrast is noted between the diminutive eizov, a grass and the sprig of proud cedar that are used in the parah adumah offering.

Similarly, what could be more of a mishpat than "do not murder"? And yet, reason alone would be insufficient. Does it include euthenasia, and if so, when? What about organ donation from someone who is entirely brain dead, but still (artificially) has heart activity? Is capital punishment moral? When is war justified, if ever? Is abortion murder? Etc..

In the case of total brain death, so that even the brain stem is not functioning, the brain cannot even keep the vital signs going in lung and heart. R' Tendler and the Chief Rabbinate see this as a direct parallel to the cases in the Talmud of the decapitated body, or one where the brain rotted or turned liquid. The difference is in our ability to determine the brain isn't functioning without such large-scale flaws. Other rabbis instead keep the definition used elsewhere in the gemara, heartbeat. The cases in the gemara are ones where the gemara knew there couldn't be a heartbeat. The primary difference is our ability to artificially keep the heart going independent of the brain, without which we wouldn't have a question.

They don't argue about the medical facts, but the basic definition: does "life" mean heartbeat (which in the days of the gemara required brain activity) or brain activity (which could only be measured by gross anatomical problems or the lack of heartbeat)? Either side would appeal to the latest technology in determining whether they definition would apply, neither is being scientifically naive.

In the case of persistent vegetative state, the brain can keep the vital functions running. However, it can never return to consciousness. (Tangent: Actually, that's not so clear. Brain Inj. 2001 Dec;15(12):1083-92 carries an article titled "Cognitive recovery from 'persistent vegetative state': psychological and personal perspectives". J Neural Neurosurg Psychiatry. 1985 Dec;48(12):1300-3 has "Unexpected improvement after prolonged posttraumatic vegetative state." In BMJ. 1993 Jun 12;306(6892):1597-600, "Recovery of patients after four months or more in the persistent vegetative state." Or read the Kate Adamson story; she was diagnosed with PVS but was actually conscious but unable to act. She lived through treatment without anesthesia because no one realized she was awake in there. But since we're looking at the philosophical issue, let's deal with the assumption that PVS were for certain what they believe it is.)

No one is arguing that Terry Schiavo is about to die, and therefore should be aided in dying. Had they not stopped her drink and food supply, there is every reason to believe she would continue living indefinitely. Nor is it the cessation of unusual suffering, as they do not believe she is conscious and therefore living a life of pain.

Assisted suicide is in general illegal in the US; Dr. Kevorkian still sits in jail. Someone who wants to commit suicide because they can no longer live after losing a girlfriend is prevented from doing so, his free will is not respected. It's not a society which in general allows suicide over quality of life.

The question is whether a life without consciousness is human life to be protected by the law. Behind the assumption underlying the law's position is that it's not as protected as other life.

Mussar, even before there was a field of psychology, recognized that not all of our decision making is conscious. As Rav Yisrael Salanter put it, "Man is a drop of intellect drowning in a sea of instincts." That a primary duty of consciousness is to shape the non-conscious part of ourselves, to make ourselves better people. The mind can't be identified with consciousness, it's far greater.

On the other hand, the Meshekh Chokhmah defines the "image of G-d" in which man was created to be our free will. Doesn't that necessitate consciousness, and therefore the PVS patient lacks the image of G-d and shouldn't be accorded the full sanctity of human life?

The basic flaw is the assumption that if the brain can't support consciousness, there isn't any. An assumption that dovetails well with observations we made in the past about the Western perspective. It's an inherently empirically oriented society, the scientifically measurable is considered more real. It is unsurprising that this case shows an identification of mind with brain. Second, it's one that values personal autonomy, and therefore consciousness which enables autonomous decision. It is therefore unsurprising that someone with a brain that does not support such autonomy is not felt to be fully alive.

In Jewish thought, however, the mind is something done by the soul. It may be physically implemented in a brain during life, but the soul and mind can outlive the body. The question therefore isn't viewed as whether there still is a mind, but whether the soul is still in the body and therefore the mind in the brain. A person's "image of G-d" is simply not empirically measurable. Scientific progress doesn't bring us any closer to answering the question of which medical states correspond to the sanctity of life or death. We have a nightly experience of a soul being in a body while not conscious. Therefore one can't say that there isn't a human soul still inhabiting the severely brain damaged and PVS body.

Thus, neither identification stands: the mind need not be measurable empirically, and the mind, soul and humanity aren't necessarily limited to consciousness. Even if the Meshech Chochmah might say they are, he wouldn't limit existance of the mind to the brain. Conscious activity isn't the sonum bonum of human life.

Last, what is the justification for terminating something even if it were considered a shadow of true human life? (Particularly if it's given that Terri Schiavo is incapable of first-hand suffering.) Isn't it reasonable to say that life is sacred enough to warrant protecting even things similar to it? Along those lines, abortion is prohibited by halakhah, barring special circumstances. This is even true according to those rishonim who do not consider it to be murder. Perhaps because potential human life is itself sacred; it need not be actual life to warrant protection.

Medical state and sanctity of life are separate questions. The Schiavo case touches on a weakness in separation of church and state. The secular approach gives us science, a great means of determining the facts of the case. We can now determine the medical state of a person in more detail and with greater accuracy than ever before. But that doesn't help us know which sets of medical states are "human life" and which are not. How can one assign moral value to one medical state over another without appealing to religion?

Purim, Yehudim and Simchah

The exile to Bavel after the first Beis Hamiqdash was attributed to many things; one of the less intuitive (and therefore more discussed) reasons given was that they didn't make a berakhah before learning Torah. What was so terrible? This period had problems with idolatry, with oppression of the poor and weak, and the destruvtion is being blamed on people who were even learning Torah?!

In one way this makes sense. If even the righteous weren't up to standard, who would the rest of the generation look up to? Who would motivate their change? But only up to a point; it still doesn't seem like a destruction-worthy flaw, even in the leadership.

The megillah is the first book to refer to us as Yehudim, Yidden, Jews. Even Mordechai, an "ish yemini", from the tribe of Binyamin, is called a Yehudi. This new usage of the word was because the Jewish people now included only survivors of the Kingdom of Yehudah (Judea).

The name "Yehudah" is significant. It comes from Leah's words upon naming her son, "This time I will thank -- odeh -- Hashem." It is no coincidence that shaped history to give us this name. We are a people of thanking. The first words out of our lips every morning are "Modeh ani lefanekha" thanking Hashem for allowing us to wake up. Rav Saadia Gaon (Emunos veDei'os 3:1) and the Chovos haLvavos (sec 2, intro.) hold that the driving force behind mitzvos is the recognition of the good Hashem bestows upon us.

"When Adar enters, we increase our simchah." What is "simchah"? Rav Dovid Lifshitz would have us hang a banner in the beis medrash that followed that quote with two more. "Ein simchah elah Torah -- there is no [true] simchah except that of Torah." "Vekhol hamarbeh harei zeh meshubach -- and whoever does more, he is praiseworthy."

There are three stories (Sanhedrin 101a) in which Rabbi Aqiva seems to laugh at an inappropriate time. First, when he, Rabban Gamliel, Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya and Rabbi Yehoshua were walking on the road, and they heard the revelry and idolatry of the Roman army loud enough to be heard from a distance from 120 mil. They mourned -- Jerusalem is in tatters, and the Romans thrive? And Rabbi Aqiva laughed -- if this is the good Hashem gives the idolater, how much more awaits the righteous! Second, when they saw a fox leaving the place of the Holy of Holies, the other rabbis cried -- isn't this the place about which the Torah says "and the stranger who enters shall die" and foxes play there? And Rabbi Aqiva laughed -- this is the fulfillment of the prophecy, which means that the prophecies of redemption shall too come to pass. When Rabbi Eliezer became ill, they went to visit him. The other rabbis were pained -- we see a veritable Torah scroll in agony, can we not share it? And Rabbi Aqiva laughed -- now I see that my rebbe is receiving his punishment in this world, and his reward still awaits him in the World-to-Come.

R' Saadia Gaon observed that laughter is the reaction people have to a sudden realization of an underlying truth. And so, when R' Akiva suddenly saw the deeper truth, he laughed. R' Saadia adds that "simchah" is the kind of happiness associated with laughter.

"When Adar enters, we increase our simchah." Purim is the story of G-d working behind the scenes, through natural forces, to redeem the Jews. That's the time when one feels simchah, insight into the deeper truth.

And that's the time one feels hoda'ah, thankfulness. It's only through that inner truth that one sees the greatness in G-d allowing us to wake up, rather than taking it for granted. If you don't even think about the marvel of having air to breate, you can't thank G-d for giving us air! That's why it's at Purim that we're first called "Yehudim".

Toward the end of the exile to Bavel we have the story of Purim. At this point, Megillas Esther tells us "laYhudim haysa orah visimchah visason viykar -- for the Jews there was light, happiness, joy and preciousness." Rabbi Yehudah (Megillah 13b) explains that orah (light) refers to Torah, simchah (happiness) is Yom Tov, sason (joy) is beris milah, and yeqar (preciousness) is tefillin.

(Without the other four terms to provide contrast and specificity to the words "Torah" and "simchah", they take on broader meaaning. Torah would include holidays, milah and tefillin -- were we not given the Torah we wouldn't have had any of them. And simchah would mean positive attitude in general, including light, joy and preciousness. "There is no simchah but Torah" is speaking in that broader sense.)

So why didn't the megillah simply say "for the Jews there was Torah, holidays, milah and tefillin. Why the code words?

In the first beis hamiqdash we had Torah, but it was not or to us. This is why the berakhah was not made. We observed the laws of Yom Tov, but found no simcha in it. We kept milah and wore tefillin, but with no joy or sense of preciousness. This basic misdirection, that halakhah was fulfilled as a duty, not a love, was what made the leadership unable to direct the masses.

With Purim, with the simcha of seeing the deeper truth, Torah took on a deeper life. We experienced the message of the berakhah, "Who chose us from among the nations and gave us His Torah" thereby correcting the flaw that lead to the exile, and started the process of redemption.

"LaYhudim haysa orah visimchah visason viykar, kein tihyeh lanu" -- so may it be for us!

Purpose of Qorbanos

When reviewing what I wrote on this subject for the Mesukim on Vayiqra, I noticed some more points. First to summarize:

Rambam (naively reading the Moreh Nevuchim): Hashem gave us qorbanos, a normal idolatrous practice, to wean us from avodah zarah.

Ramban: How is this possible? Noach offered a qorban and there were no idolators or peer pressure. Rather qorbanos are to unify all planes of human existance: the thought of teshuvah, the speech of confession, and the action of the qorban. In addition, the person who sinned and brought a qorban sees the offering and realizes the severity of the act; that justice untempered by mercy would have called for his own death, not an animal's.

(The question remains how the Ramban understands qorbanos that are less related to sin.)

Narvoni: The Rambam doesn't speak of qorbanos as caused by the practice being avodah zarah. Rather, the practice expresses an inate human limitation. And if one doesn't allow an expression for avodas Hashem, the need would lead people to avodah zarah.

Abarbanel: There are many proofs that qorbanos are part of an ideal, and not a concession to human limitation.

I then suggested a variant on the Narvoni's idea that doesn't fit the Rambam's words, that the need to give in worship is a human need, but a positive thing, not a limitation. Any real relationship seeks expression in giving -- whether it's qorbanos or flowers. (And in both cases, the primary gift is the act of giving; Hashem doesn't need the qorban and my wife tends not to take a second look at the flowers.)

So much for the summary.

1- The word "qorban" is the "-an" (object related to) suffix added to /qrb/ (to come close, the root of the word "kiruv", to cause to come close). However, this has (at least) two meanings: an object that expresses a closeness already felt, or one that causes a closeness.

Perhaps this is reflected in our machloqes. The Rambam, especially as understood by the Narvoni, sees a qorban as an expression of a feeling already there, one which we therefore see in avodah zarah, and which the person needs in order to feel like a worshipper. The Ramban sees a qorban as a tool for acheiving closeness by unifying all his abilities to this end.

2- The Meshech Chokhmah (introduction to Vayiqra) finds a role for each explanation. The Rambam's notion of weaning was the role of bamos, of altars built to G-d on mountaintops, outside of the mishkan. The weaning period ended when the Beis haMiqdash was dedicated in Yerushalayim, which is why bamos became prohibited at that time. However, we failed, avodah zarah and bamos thrived throughout the first Temple. Qorbanos in the Beis haMiqdash is called a rei'ach nikho'ach (a pleasant smell before Hashem) because they were to unify the worlds, as explained by the Ramban.

In light of the two meanings we gave to qorban, this explains why bamos were not mandatory -- they were only for an expression of a feeling already there. As it says in parashas Vayiqra, "ish ki yaqriv mikem qorban -- a person, when he brings from you a qorban", when he chooses. However, the qorbanos at the mishkan or beis hamiqdash are not if/when, but obligatory. Because they create the motivation even when it's not already there.

3- Allowing the Meshech Chokhmah's idea that the Rambam's and Ramban's ideas can coexist, we can reach an interesting conclusion. According to the Ramban, the point of qorban is about it being an action more than the physical object being offered. Perhaps this is true even when the qorban is Rambam-esque, an expression of a human need. Like the husband who brings flowers, the primary gift is the giving itself, the statement "I need to give".

4- What a far cry from the 9 seconds given to Qorbanos between "Atah Hu" and "Rabbi Yishma'el" in the minyan I attend every morning. Where's that "need to give" that marks having a true relationship with the Creator?

I don't think all the thoughts above will help. I think the gap between mind and heart is too great for philosophising to create an emotional need. Emotions are build slowly, through repetition. Perhaps we should pick one tefillah from Qorbanos, maybe the Tamid that the Shacharis we are davening derives from. And not only having these kavanos when saying it, but also simply thinking, "Ribono shel olam, I can't even feel the loss of qorbanos. Please help me!"

Eilu va'Eilu part II

[The story so far: In part I I gave a survey of opinions from rishonim discussed in essays by RM Halbertal and Rav Michael Rosensweig.]

My personal inclination is close to the philosophy of the Maharal's. If I can use a variant on Plato's metaphor, we are like people looking at shadows of an object. Since reality can not capture all "three dimensions" of "divrei E-lokim Chaim", we see what looks like conflicting "two dimensional" shadows. Shapes that accurately represent the whole, but only from the direction from which we are shining the light. The process of pesaq is that of deciding how we should grow and develop given where we stand; what are angle ought to be in relation to that 3 dimentional object and therefore what shadow it casts.

One can't adopt two conflicting positions, neither leniencies (as would the Conservative movement do) nor stringencies (as per the insufficiently fictional "Chumrah of the Month Club"). That would be combining two different angles, to produce a "shadow" the object could never really cast. One is no longer representing the "object", the Word of G-d.


True pluralism (within a range of valid positions) seems to be a compelling conclusion from the Gemara (Hagigah 3b) is concerned about the person who will note when "those [Rabbis] prohibit, yet those [authorities] permit [the very same thing]... how can I possibly learn Torah today?" The answer is found in the words of Koheles 12, "Nasnu meiRo'eh echad - both views were given by the same shepherd."

Rav Tzadoq haKohein (Resisei Laylah sec. 17), defines a different kind of logic when it comes to thought than when it comes to action, and uses this to understand the nature of pluralism.

Whenever a new thing found about the Torah by any wise person, simultaneously arises its opposite.... When it comes to the realm of action (po'al) it can not be that two things true simultaneously. In the realm of the mind (machshavah), on the other hand, it is impossible for a man to think about one thing without considering the opposite.

This model differs from the Maharal's. The Maharal assumes that truths can't contradict. Rav Tzadoq denies the applicability of the rule of contradiction. The two ideas can coexist: Man's thoughts are designed to be able to handle conflicting truths because it is the best way to approximate a full understanding of the Divine Truth. Like the famous parable of the blind men and the elephant: the elephant is not a fan, a wall, a rope or a tree trunk, and the complete picture is closer to the contradiction as a whole than any one position.

This is actually the literal meaning of the word "teiqu". When the gemara's debate can not reach a conclusion, it says teiku. Most students are taught the medrashic meaning, that it's an acronym for "tishbi yetzareitz qushyos ve'ibayos -- Eliyahu the Tishbi will answer all questions". But the word itself means "let it stand". Not that there is a question left unanswered, but that both positions stand -- despite the contradiction.

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For the mathematically inclined, then there's Goedel's Theorem. Everyone else may choose to stop at this point.

In short and without lots of formula and Greek letters, Kurt Goedel presented a set of theorems that boil down to showing that any sufficiently robust finite formal system that is consistent (i.e. does not claim both something and its opposite -- A and not A) must be incomplete. This includes all systems that have formal rules from getting from a finite set of givens to an infinite set of conclusions, and are robust enough to be used to describe mathematics. All such systems must either be able to produce contradictory conclusions, or be unable to produce conclusions that are known to be true.

According to the Malbim (intro. to Vayiqra), all of the Oral Torah could be reconstructed from the Written Torah and 613 rules of logic and derashah. Even if we add the halakhos leMosheh miSinai, to fit the understanding of most that these have no source in the written Torah (the Malbim's statement would imply they do), this is a finite number of postulates and a finite set of rules for elaborating on them. What about Goedel's Theorem.

Given eilu va'eilu The question could be resolved on a number of levels:

As Rav Tzadoq haKohein writes, Divrei E-lokim Chaim are not consistant. Either inherently so, or -- as the Maharal takes it -- our comprehension is limited to inconsistent approximations. Divrei E-lokim Chaim can therefore be complete.

Halakhah as ruled would have to be constitutive, Rabbanim given the power to define which position is correct. If we took a "retrieval" (Rabbanim try to reconstruct the forgotten) or "accumulative" (deductions from the known) model without a constitutive component, then when we rule out contradictions we would necessarily create areas in which no ruling could be produced.

Eilu va'Eilu - part I

Before giving my own thoughts, I would like to discuss two recent articles on Eilu va'eilu:

• Moshe Halbertal on "Controvery in Halacha"
• R' Michael Rosensweig's article "Elu Va-Elu Divre Elokim Hayyim: Halakhic Pluralism And Theories Of Controversy"

As background: The gemara (Eiruvin 13b) speaks of a protracted debate between Batei Hillel and Shammai. Finally, a bas qol emerged and said "Eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim, vehalakhah keBeis Hillel -- these and those are the Words of the Living G-d (or: G-d of Life), but the law is like Beis Hillel." (I already wrote on the role of this bas qol in defining law.) The question is whether this is meant literally, that G-d gave us multiple contadicting messages, and if so, how and why?

RM Halbertal proposes that there are three basic positions on plurality in halakhah:

1- Retrieval: All of Torah was given at Sinai, and therefore machloqesin (debates) are due to forgotten information.
He finds this opinion to be typical of many ge'onuim and the Seifer haQabbalah, and is based on statements like "Why were there so many debates between the schools of Hillel and Shammai [when there were so few between the mentors themselves? Because they did not properly serve their rabbis." Implied is that much was forgotten because of this lack of connection to the previous generation.

2- Accumulative: Torah is built analytically from what was given. Therefore, machloqesin come from different minds reaching different conclusions. This is the Rambam's position among others. It comes from sources like Rabbi Aqiva's "finding mounds and mounds of laws in the crowns atop the letters".

Personally, I would be inclined to say that these need not contradict, and perhaps both types of debates occur. Except that according to the Rambam, there are no machloqesin in underived law; in his opinion this is one of the critical features of a halakhah leMosheh miSinai (a law given to Moshe since Sinai). The Rambam makes the flawlessness of the mesorah incontravertable. Only contructions are open to debate. So, while one may choose to embrace the idea that both occured, one must be aware that that's not shitas haRambam.

3- Constitutive: The poseiq (halachic decisor) doesn't discover what's correct halakhah. Rather, part of the definition of "correct" is the poseiq's say-so; Hashem gave them the power to decide and define law. This is the position of the Ramban, the Ritva and the Ran. A typical source: In order to make sanhedrin you needed to be able to find 49 arguments that something is tamei, and 49 that the same something is tahor. G-d gave us all 98 arguments, and empowered the rabbinate to decide which is law.

Here, I don't see why one must assert they are different. After all, even the Ramban and his students don't give the poseiq carte blanche. He may have the power to define law, but there are limits to which definitions are valid. It would seem from the Ritva (see the quote below, in the discussion of the other article) that the process of finding choices fit the "accumulative" model; G-d could have given us all 98 arguments not directly, but implicitly for us to derive. The argument the poseiq actually derives and finds authoritative could then be correct because of the "constitutive" model, because that's man's role in the halachic process.

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R' Michael Rosensweig's article gives a different perspective. (I'm skipping the first two sections, getting right to the subject of machloqes within halakhah. Otherwise the scope would be too broad for this format.)

RMR cites the ma'aseh of "eilu va'eilu" (Eiruvin 13b) and the gemara (Chagiga 3b) describing learning as one rav insisting tamei, the other tahor to open a discussion of halakhic plurality.

The Nesivos haMishpat holds that in reality one opinion is wrong, but the mitzvah of talmud Torah includes the studying and winnowing out of wrong opnions. RMR understands this to mean that studying these opinions is part of the encounter with devar Hashem (word of G-d).

The Netziv defines two types of pesaq:

• Hora'ah, dating back to the role of the kohein. From this perspective, both positions are the "substance" Torah, in a literal understanding of "eilu va'eilu".
• Hakhra'ah ledoros (making a determination for generations), the logical analysis of the shofeit mechoqeiq (legislating judge). This produces the hilkheta gemirei (deduced conclusion), and as Moshe Rabbeinu was taught "everything that a student will in the future give hora'ah", Moshe was actually taught that one was more true than the other as he was told which will be the future hora'ah. Within this category, there are two subtypes:
  • Nitzotzos (term taken from Sanhedrin 34a), or netu'im (from Chagiga 3b), which maintain some or Torah (light of Torah), but of lesser quantity.
  • Those which are outright rejected.

RMR then shows that the Rama might conform to this model.

Rashi (Kesuvos 57a, "QM"L") seems to support a real plurality. To quote:

When a debate revolves around the attribution of a doctrine to a particular individual, there is only room for one truth. However, when two Amorairn enter into a halakhic dispute, each arguing the halakhic merits of his view, each drawing upon comparisons to establish the authenticity of his perspective, there is no absolute truth and falsehood. About such issues one can declare that both represent the view of the living God. On some occasions one perspective will prove more authentic, and under other circumstances the other view will appear to be more compelling. The effectiveness of particular rationales shift as conditions of their application change even if only subtly.

The Ritva (on "eilu va'eilu", Eiruvin 13b) writes, "When Moshe ascended to receive the Torah, it was demonstrated to him that every matter was subject to forty-nine lenient and forty-nine stringent approaches. When he queried about this, God responded that the scholars of each generation were given the authority to decide among these perspectives in order to establish the normative halakha."

The Ritva's phrasing, that matters being subject to 98 different approaches rather than Moshe being given 98 interpretations seems to me to be what R' Moshe Halbertal called the "accumulative" approach, even though he then continues to weave it with the "constitutive" one. But to return to R' Rosensweig...

The Maharshal writes that since each soul was at Har Sinai, each soul presents its perspective on emes. The soul doesn't simply passively report the emes. The Maharal similarly peaks of a the Ideal pesaq as manifest in heaven, and how man in the "real world" can only approximate that Ideal. (Very Platonic, to my ear.) The reason for plurality is because the actual truth can't be fully captured within this world.

This last opinion reminds me of R' Moshe Koppel's position in "Metahalakhah". He argues that halakhah is best transmitted the same way grammar is: the native speaker's feel for right and wrong. It's only due to loss of our status as "native speakers", our progressive lost of the Sinai culture, that we need to codify rules. And just like codified rules of grammer, the rules only approximate the reality they're trying to describe. The Maharal says that this world can't capture halakhic truth, whereas RMK is arguing that even of that which was given at Sinai, it could not fit a rule set.

RMR opens section IV with an explicit statement of the "constitutive" perspective. Since halachic truth includes plural views, the poseiq is defining which truth is law. The fact that the other is true doesn't make is any more acceptable as a fall-back position legally.

According to the Maharshal and the Arukh haShulchan, the need for pesaq is "so that it will not be like there are two Toros". Since either position is truth, it's not a need to determine Torah, but that of communal unity. The zaqein mamrei (a rebellious elder who refuses to bring his ruling in line with the Sanhedrin's) is punished because the effects of his actions ("like two Toros", ruining the entire concept of halachic process) are so damaging -- not because he's promoting falsehood.

The Ran and the Chinukh apply lo sasur (do not disagree) to modern rejections of rabbinic conclusions, not only the zaqein mamrei in the Sanhedrin. Maharam ibn Habib (aside: should I recognize this name?) applies a ZM parallel to any judge, and "we do not divide money according to the majority" (ie rulings are all or nothing, you don't make someone repay proportionally according to the percentages of votes among the judges) requires him to acquiesce to the majority.

[In part II I will iy"H discuss my own thoughts and opinions on the subject.]

Trends in Resolving Torah and Science

This is the nearest I plan to get to discussing L'affaire Slifkin on this blog. I'm not going to discuss issues dealt with by R' Gil Student in his Hirhurim blog, or in any of the other Jewish blogs. My opinion is already better represented on line already than what I could produce. When I read R' Shternbuch's article I noticed a subtext. Once I stripped away all the points about which I disagree, this unwritten given that I saw as a subtext still rung true.

I see two basic and opposing trends in how segments of the frum world approach the question of apparent conflicts between Torah and science. An action, and a reaction. I find both worrisome. And, while R' Shternbuch's essay represents an example of the reactionary trend, I share his concern about the action.

R' JB Soloveitchik, in The Lonely Man of Faith, contrasts Adam as described in Bereishis 1, with that of ch. 2. Adam I is described as the last step in creation, the pinacle, who should "be fruitful and multiple, fill the earth and subdue it. Rule the fish of the sea and the bird of the sky..." Master of all he surveys, through his science and technology. Adam II is a partner with G-d as he names the animals. His marriage isn't about procreating, but "and they shall be one flesh", having a relationship with another. In the ideal, one finds a balance of these archtypes; using halakhah, we can navigate this dialectic. However, in contemporary society, where "progress" is identified with technological progress, man overly identifies with Adam I.

So, one can phrase the current encounter as a dilemma between how to balance Adam I and Adam II when our perceptions of science and of Torah contradict. I write "our perceptions" because in reality, of course, they can't contradict. The same Author wrote both nature and the Torah. However, our understandings can be inaccurate, incomplete, or simply limited by our being merely human trying to understand something with the complexity of a masterpiece by an Infinite Author.

While many scientists do realize that saying "The apple fell because of gravity" and "G-d made the apple fall" do not contradict, many do. There is an entire culture of Scientism which believes that religion stems entirely from an ignorance they're working to eliminate. For example, I found a HS bio book that said (roughly, from memory):

Using evolution, we can explain how life as we know it emerged. We see how complex organisms can arise without there being any preexisting design.

If not exactly that, it's pretty close to it. Or less subtly, people like Dawkins or the "Skeptic" column in Scientific American wouldn't be complaining about Intelligent Design. ID is the idea that all of current theory about our origins is as right as any other theory, but that it shows there is a Designer who got us to this point. These people and numerous other scientists labeled "Creationism in sheep's clothing".

In "Scientism" the pursuit of science is confused with the pursuit of knowledge. There is an old saying that science is like climbing a cliff. When the scientist finally scales to the top of the cliff, he'll find himself where the religious have been all along. However, the person who turns science into his "Ism" will mistake the religious man for just more cliff, and keep on climbing! (And sure enough, he'll reach the top of the man's head and not find anything when he looks around...) It is an egotistical cry of Adam I, proclaiming himself master of all and denying the existance and reality of anything beyond his mastery.

When frum Jews seek natural explanations, what motivates us? Why isn't "G-d performed a miracle for His unfathomable reasons" sufficient? How many of us are doing so because deep down we've bought into Scientism's premises, and we only do invoke G-d for things we can't otherwise explain. The notion of finding physical explanation is sound, defending by the Rambam, his son R' Avraham, the Ralbag, and others.

I'm speaking about our motivation for choosing this path: Is it hashkafic?

Nor is a lack of creationism the only objection under discussion. It's also, a question of the mabul and Bavel, which many Orthodox Jews question the historicity of, or question whether they were global, neither idea have the same masoretic foundation to build from as a non-literal creation. And a general question of when Chazal's pronouncements are to be questioned. The role of changes of scientific theory in pesaq. Are maamarei Chazal placed "on the run" fleeing from the advancing tide of science? Or do we better anchor them, and try our hardest to find their own logic, unchanging in the face of changes in theory?

In theory, these could be very different hashkafic questions. So why are so many people reaching the parallel conclusions in each? Regardless of the existence of a reason or justification for each step taken, there is an emergent pattern in much of contemporary O thought that is disconcerting. Why does one seek those reasons that so consistently justify retreat? Is this not typical of western man, of this over-focus on Adam I, maximizing the role of human comprehension and minimizing the need to invoke G-d?

I think that's what R' Shternbuch was writing about when he says, "Nevertheless their concern is to make even this miraculous event as close to nature as possible. In other words, they much prefer to make the world as natural as possible and to minimize the miraculous." He's not talking about nature vs. miracle, but whether we elect to invoke G-d, or elect to keep the universe a place we can comprehend or master. And if it's not R' Shternbuch's concern, it's still mine.

But I'm no less concerned by this reaction to the shock of modernity, common in a large segment of the population. The proper response to rampant Adam I-ism is not an exclusive focus on Adam II. Man was not designed to be a passive recipient of G-d's beneficience, but a covenental partner. We can not forgo our own ability to think and create, or to leave that responsibility to a select few.

Someone emailed me about the current "antisophical" trend in world view. He described it as a reaction to the birth of Reform. I also described this phenomenon way back at the start of the creationism discussion, when I wrote that I believe that more people insist on literalism now than did before there was a scientific challenge. It's why so many insist on taking every medrash literally (a position not supported by rishonim or the vast majority acharonim). It's also why even amongst the words of chazal, we gravitate toward the fantastic. For example, there are two Rashis about the age of Racheil when she married Yitzchaq. Children are taught the opinion that she was 3, not necessarily the one where she was 15.

This trend I see as more damaging even than another reaction to Reform -- the neglect of Nakh and diqduq.

There is no word "antisophical". The tendency to prefer black-and-white solutions is described from a word related to the Sophists, though: it's "unsophisticated". Preference should be given precision, not simplicity.

So how do I expect these conflicts to be resolved? Each one, case by case. No easy answers, no trends should emerge. It's a dialectic tension, a point over which life isn't supposed to be easy. And many questions will not yield an answer to us. It still is the problem of the finite man trying to understand the work of an Infinite Creator.

A mashal:

We currently have two very successful physical theories: quantum mechanics (QM) which was born in the head of Heisenberg y"sh and developed by numerous other people -- most of them Jews. Including Einstein. There is also relativity (which has two parts: special and general), which was pretty much entirely Einstein's. QM works well in the domain of the very small, relativity works well with the very large. (In between, Newton's old system is a good enough approximation and people don't bother with such things.) But they are based on contradictory assumptions. Figuring out quantum gravity -- a theory of gravity that fits both QM and relativity, is a challenge. Filling this challenge are things like string and membrane theories, the Higgs Boson (the subject of the book "The God Particle", and others. For now, there is no real resolution.

But even though the two theories are built on contradictory assumptions, scientists place trust (bitachon) in them. They each work so well in their chosen domains, making more successful predictions than any other theories in science. For example, in a GPS device, a chip that was designed using QM adjusts for the effects of gravity on the signal from the positioning satellite, in accordance with general relativity. The scientist and engineer have faith (emunah) that each will have to be tweaked only minorly to get them to fit, not a major overhaul.

As you can tell from my use of language, I think this is a fitting metaphor. There are times when you simply have to use science for its target domain, understanding how the physical universe behaves, and Torah for its target domain -- understanding how I ought to behave, and my place in life. And simply have emunah that some resolution exists.